| Firearm Laws |
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| Search & Seizure |
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Hiland v. Trent, 868 N.E. 2d 396, Third District
Appellate Court (5/16/07).
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People v. Williams, 858 N.E. 2nd 606. Illinois Appellate Court, Ist District.
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United States v. Cherry, 436 F. 3d 769 ( C.A. 7, Ill., 2006)
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People v. Miller, 824 N.E. 2d 1080 ,
Illinois 1st District Appellate Court (2-7-05).
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HUDSON v. MICHIGAN. United States Supreme Court, June 2006. 126 S. Ct. 2159
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People v. Dieppa, 357 Ill.
App. 3d 847
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ILLINOIS v. CABALLES. U.S.
Supreme Court (1/25/05)
on
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois. 03-923
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DEVENPECK et al. v. ALFORD No.
03-710
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People v. Parra, 352 Ill. App.
3d 584, 817 N.E. 2d 141 ( 2d Dist., 10/12/04)
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People v. Travis Smith, 346
Ill. App. 3d 146, 803 N.E. 2d 1074
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People v. Starbuck, 358 Ill
App. 3d 234 (3rd Dist. 2005)
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People v. Mendoza, 846 N.E. 2d 169 (2d Dist App. Ct.,
March 2006)
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People v. Frederick Hampton, 358 Ill App. 3d 1029 (2d Dist 2005)
and People v. Shinara Mathews, 357 Ill App. 3d 1062 (3rd Dist. 2005)
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| In People v. Collins, 824 N.E. 2d 268, the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld a trial court finding of “guilty” of “reckless
discharge of a firearm,” and reversed and remanded the case to the Appellate
Court that had reversed the trial court’s decision. The defense argued that
there was no pointing of a gun in the direction of any individual. The facts
showed that several responding police officers on the scene were in close
proximity to the shooter/defendant, who was firing his 9 millimeter handgun in
the air to “celebrate” the New Year. |
| A person commits reckless discharge of a firearm by
discharging a firearm in a reckless manner that endangers the bodily safety of
an individual. 72- ILCS 5/24-1.5 (Illinois Revised Statutes). The State had to
prove that the defendant both “recklessly” discharged the firearm, and that he
“endangered” the bodily safety of an individual. The defense argued that the
State failed to prove that firing the gun in the air could have endangered the
safety of an individual. |
| The Court held that while discharging the firearm in the
direction of another person, as stated within the related offense of
“aggravated discharge of a firearm” would require intentionally firing of
a weapon knowingly and directly at someone, this lesser offense “does not by
its language require discharge of a firearm in the direction of someone.”
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| Following are some highlights of the Court’s decision (with
some omissions not noted in the quouted text):
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| “. . .[I]n order to satisfy the element of
“endangerment” contained in the statute, the State must establish that a
defendant’s reckless conduct creates a dangerous situation--such that an
individual was in peril of probable harm or loss. |
| “. . . Even if we were to accept the proposition that the
statute is ambiguous, legislative transcripts reveal that the mere shooting of
a gun into the air is precisely the type of conduct the legislature intended to
criminalize, and the type of “endangerment” the legislature intended to
protect against when it enacted the statute.” |
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[Addressing the defense argument that the State failed to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no evidence that the area was
populated, or that the incident occurred in a residential area, no evidence of
bullets falling near or around the officers, and no evidence of recovered
bullets from the backyard or surrounding area, the Court went on to note that
one officer was 15 to 20 feet from the offender, other police officers were in
the vicinity of falling bullets, there were four homes in proximity to the
location of the shooting, and “[t]he inherent danger caused by the reckless
discharge of a firearm into the air, and the obvious ricochet effect that may
occur when bullets fall to the ground, are matters of common sense. In this
case, what inevitably came down endangered, placed individuals in peril of
probable harm or loss, those in vicinity of the discharge.” The Court further
noted that endangerment of the officer in close proximity to the defendant
would have, alone, sufficed to meet the statutory requirements of the offense.]
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| “. . . For the reason discussed, we reverse the judgment of
the appellate court and remand the matter to the appellate court for
consideration of the remaining issues on appeal.” |
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Reversed and remanded. |
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