| Firearm Laws |
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| Search & Seizure |
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Hiland v. Trent, 868 N.E. 2d 396, Third District
Appellate Court (5/16/07).
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People v. Williams, 858 N.E. 2nd 606. Illinois Appellate Court, Ist District.
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United States v. Cherry, 436 F. 3d 769 ( C.A. 7, Ill., 2006)
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People v. Miller, 824 N.E. 2d 1080 ,
Illinois 1st District Appellate Court (2-7-05).
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HUDSON v. MICHIGAN. United States Supreme Court, June 2006. 126 S. Ct. 2159
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People v. Dieppa, 357 Ill.
App. 3d 847
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ILLINOIS v. CABALLES. U.S.
Supreme Court (1/25/05)
on
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois. 03-923
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DEVENPECK et al. v. ALFORD No.
03-710
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People v. Parra, 352 Ill. App.
3d 584, 817 N.E. 2d 141 ( 2d Dist., 10/12/04)
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People v. Travis Smith, 346
Ill. App. 3d 146, 803 N.E. 2d 1074
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People v. Starbuck, 358 Ill
App. 3d 234 (3rd Dist. 2005)
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People v. Mendoza, 846 N.E. 2d 169 (2d Dist App. Ct.,
March 2006)
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People v. Frederick Hampton, 358 Ill App. 3d 1029 (2d Dist 2005)
and People v. Shinara Mathews, 357 Ill App. 3d 1062 (3rd Dist. 2005)
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People v. Miller, 824 N.E. 2d 1080 ,
Illinois 1st District Appellate Court (2-7-05).
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| If you are standing on the corner, you had better just be
“watching all the girls go by.” In a recent Illinois 1st District Appellate
Court affirmation of a “guilty“ verdict , the defendant, standing at a
specified corner at about 4:p/m, was spotted by an officer responding to an
“in-person” tip from a citizen that a black male (fitting a very general
description of the defendant)--that is, a black man with dark clothing-- was
standing on that corner and had brandished a firearm. After a pat-down search
revealed a weapon on the defendant he succeeded in escaping from the officer,
and was later arrested at his home. The Appeals Court sustained the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence (recovered
firearm), and rejected the defense reliance upon a U.S. Supreme Court case and
two Illinois cases, where the descriptions given by the informants in those
cases were found to be insufficient to justify a Terry stop and frisk.
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| Defendant’s analogy of his case to Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S.
266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000) was distinguished, the Court noting the anonymous
tip in J.L. lacked the moderate indicia of reliability --the tipster
having given an accurate description of the offender absent any first-hand
knowledge of the concealed criminal activity--while in this case the tipster
told the officer that he “observed” a man displaying a gun.
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| The Court also rejected the defense argument that the
description was “general and vague,” finding that “the State did present
evidence that the informant described the person with the gun as a black man
wearing dark clothing standing on a specific corner.” |
| The following highlights summarize the Court’s final
determination of the defense argument regarding the alleged general and vague
“description” given to the officer by the informant:
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| “Defendant further argues that the informant’s description was
insufficient to justify a Terry stop because it was not particular
enough to eliminate innocent individuals, as any number of black men could be
near the corner of Lemoyne and Spaulding at 4:00 p.m. As noted by the State,
whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to warrant a Terry stop depends
on the totality of the circumstances. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S at 330, 110
S.Ct. at 2416, 110 L Ed. at 309; People v. Jackson. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 729, 284 Ill.
Dec. 752, 810 N.E. 2d 542. On these facts, we conclude that the stop was
justified and that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence. An individual informed officers Rodriguez and Lazaro near
North Avenue and Spaulding that he had observed a black male wearing dark
clothing displaying a gun at the corner of Lemoyne and Spaulding. The officers
reasonably relied on this information, as it was provided by an identifiable
individual who voluntarily came forward to report possible criminal behavior.
The officers then drove the approximately one-eight of the mile to that corner
where they observed the defendant, who matched the description given by the
informant. Because the defendant matched the description and was standing on
the corner of Lemoyne and Spaulding shortly after the officers were approached
by the informant, we conclude they had specific and articulable facts to
justify a Terry stop. Because the informant said he had seen a gun,
Rodriguez reasonably suspected defendant was armed and was justified in
conducting a frisk. See In Re A.V., 336 Ill. App. 3d. at 144, 270 Ill.
Dec. 536, 783 N.E. 2d 111. The gun then fell from the defendant’s waistband as
he fled. Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied. For the reasons
stated above, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.”
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